How competitive is South Africa ? Advances and challenges in the transformation of the Cape wine industry by Ewert, Joachim
 Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer
Revue de géographie de Bordeaux 
231-232 | Juillet-Octobre 2005
Vignobles de l'hémisphère sud
How competitive is South Africa ? Advances and
challenges in the transformation of the Cape wine
industry
Joachim Ewert
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/com/305
DOI : 10.4000/com.305
ISSN : 1961-8603
Éditeur
Presses universitaires de Bordeaux
Édition imprimée
Date de publication : 1 juillet 2005
Pagination : 371-396
ISSN : 0373-5834
 
Référence électronique
Joachim Ewert, « How competitive is South Africa ? Advances and challenges in the transformation of
the Cape wine industry », Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer [En ligne], 231-232 | Juillet-Octobre 2005, mis en ligne
le 01 juillet 2008, consulté le 30 avril 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/com/305  ; DOI :
10.4000/com.305 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 30 avril 2019.
© Tous droits réservés
How competitive is South Africa ?
Advances and challenges in the
transformation of the Cape wine
industry
Joachim Ewert
1 Today  South  Africa  is  the  world’s  fifth  largest  producer  of  wine.  It  exports  around
240 million litres a year – up from 23 million litres in 1991. Most of this goes to Europe.
Here the most important wine market is the United Kingdom (UK) where it has been able
to win a market share of 10 % - not insignificant if one considers that it had virtually
nothing twelve years ago. At home the number of wine cellars have grown from some 180
in the mid-1990s to 428 in 2004. The Cape wine lands draw 43 % of all tourists to South
Africa. All in all the industAry supports some 250 000 livelihoods (fig. 1).
2 On  the  surface  this  looks  good  and  suggests  a  buoyant  industry  on  the  up. The
performance is even more remarkable if  one keeps in mind that over the last ten to
fifteen years farmers etc. had to face up to changes that, taken together, amounted to
nothing less than a ‘shock to the system’. These are : firstly, the process of local industry
deregulation  and  restructuring ;  secondly,  the  increasing  integration  of  the  local
industry  into  international  markets  and  value  chains ;  and  thirdly,  the  legislative
changes that have accompanied democracy in South Africa.
3 These transitions,  it  will  be argued,  have had complex effects.  On the one hand,  the
industry has seen lateral expansion and an impressive, sustained rise of exports. On the
other  hand,  many  co-operative  wine  cellars  and  their  members  have  found  it  very
difficult to re-gear themselves away from the industry’s historic orientation towards bulk
wine  production,  and  to  face  up  to  the  ‘quality  revolution’  and  the  demands  of
supermarket wine retailers.
4 So, there is a substantial number of co-op cellars who find it very difficult to gain entry
into overseas markets and become internationally competitive – this despite the fact that
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a ‘wine cluster’ has been in existence in South Africa for a long time. However, as Michael
Porter  points  out,  it  is  not  the  existence  of  a  cluster  per  se  that  makes  for
competitiveness, but the nature of the cluster 1.  In the case of South Africa, it will be
argued,  it  is  decades  of  regulation  and  government  protection,  plus  isolation  from
international markets that caught many co-operatives flat-footed when the transition set
in. With no subsidies or the like from the new state, new industry institutions have been
established to facilitate and steer the change process, trying to save those that in danger
of going under. Whether they will succeed is by no means clear at this stage. In a few
years from now the South African wine industry may find itself to be more competitive,
but also more ‘lean’ than today. So while there may be more ‘winners’ there will also be
more ‘losers’.
5 One of the most noticeable features of the South African wine industry between 1917 and
the mid-1990s was its elaborate regulatory system, presided over by the Kooperatiewe
Wijnbouwers Vereniging van Zuid-Afrika Bpkt (KWV) 2. Planting quotas, minimum prices
and mechanisms of  ‘surplus removal’  decisively shaped the dominant features of  the
South African wine industry for the greater part of the 20 th century (Ewert, 2003).
6 At the level of primary production an important part was played by the co-operative
cellars, which came to dominate wine production. Most of these implemented a ‘pool
system’ in terms of which grapes of a particular cultivar were sold in bulk, with farmers
being paid according to the number of tons delivered and the selling price realised for the
pool as a whole. An important objective of every co-operative was to realise the highest
possible financial return (‘payouts’) for its members. Co-ops were also linked closely to
the networks of white power in the rural Western Cape. Rural civil society in the farming
areas  of  the  Western Cape  was  dominated  by  the  white  landed settler  elite.  Formal
institutions such as the National Party and the Broederbond obviously played a key role ;
but as important were the informal networks of  filiation and affiliation between key
settler  families  –  and  the  way  these  networks  allowed  political  control  of  agro-
institutions 3.
7 From early on this system was marked by a high degree of downstream concentration and
integration. Farmers and their co-operatives sold most of their wine in bulk to the KWV
and other  producing  wholesalers.  Although they  were  guaranteed a  minimum price,
periodic  surplus  production  and  a  limited  domestic  market  continued  to  favour  the
wholesalers well into the 1990s. In addition, the distilling industry – buoyed by South
Africa’s distinctive brandy market - played an unusually important role. Not only did it
help with the removal  of  surplus  wine,  but  the producing wholesalers  on whom co-
operatives so heavily depended came to see distilling as the place where the real money
was to be made :  one author described the South African wine industry as ‘…a vast
distillery draining a partly subsidised annual wine lake. (Robinson, 1999, p. 648).
8 Though these features institutionalised the power and interests of the settler elite, it also
had very important consequences for the development of the core of the industry. It
encouraged the development of a mass production regime that rewarded those who could
deliver  high  volumes  of  low  quality  grapes  with  high  sugar  levels.  Grape  growers,
protected by their co-ops’ duty to buy whatever members produced, concentrated on
getting their tons per hectare high. ‘Quality’ had not yet become the hegemonic concept
it was to become in the 1990s, and concepts like ‘terroir’ ‘super blocks’ (of vineyards),
‘canopy control’ etc. were not part of the co-op discourse before the 1990s. Wine makers
and co-operative staff were not required to develop special skills regarding marketing.
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Furthermore,  with capital  expenditure having to be funded out of  lower payouts for
members (co-ops were prohibited by law from sourcing equity on the capital market),
essential  improvements  like  replacing  crushers  and  filters  and  adding  tanks  for  the
purpose of differentiated quality production were left to languish. In any event, with
little domestic demand for quality wines and with the KWV’s statutory monopoly barring
local producers from international markets, few saw any need for change.
9 As  important  as  the  sector’s  orientation  towards  bulk  wine  production  was  its
dependency  on  cheap  black  labour.  Until  the  1980s,  labour  arrangements  on  South
African  wine  farms  were  characterized  by  a  racially  hierarchical  and  authoritarian
paternalism inherited and adapted from early Cape slave society (Crais,  1992 ;  Scully,
1992 ; Dooling, 1992 ; Du Toit, 1998 ; Ewert et Hamman). Farming styles in the Western
Cape  and  beyond  were  shaped  by  the  expectations  of  the  white  settler  elite  that
controlled most of commercial farming and the values of patriarchal white mastery that
was such an important part of this elite’s cultural framework. In its simplest form this
involved a close link between white identity, land ownership, and a fierce insistence on
the farmer’s independence and final authority over all who lived and worked on the land.
Generations  of  colonial  settlement,  slavery and racial  domination have knitted these
concepts deeply into the social construction of white and black identities. To be a white
farmer has been, for at least three hundred years, to be a ‘master’ defined not only by the
ownership of a farm but also by the relationships of deference and authority that exist
between farm owner and farm servant (Ross, 1983, 1986 ; Crais, 1992 ; Marincowitz, 1985 ;
Scully, 1992).
10 The relationships between farm owners and workers have not been simply exploitative,
but  were  shaped  by  the  discourses  of  paternalism.  The  notion  of  themselves  as
benevolent  but  firm  protectors  and  disciplinarians  of  a  grateful  and  appreciative
population of  on-farm servants has been an important part  of  the self-conception of
farmers in the Western Cape and elsewhere in South Africa since the 18 th century.
Ultimately, however, it was a hierarchical relationship, marginalizing and silencing the
voices of those whose labour helped create the wealth of the sector. (Du Toit, 1998).
11 Neither has paternalism persisted unchanged since the end of slavery. Rather, its survival
has been a matter of mutation and adaptation in the midst of capitalist modernisation
(Du Toit, 1983, 1998, 2002). In the 1980s this process of modernisation gained particular
impetus through ‘reform from above’  -  initiatives launched from within the industry
itself and spearheaded by the ‘Rural Foundation’ (RF). A brainchild of key figures in the
farming  community  of  Stellenbosch,  the  RF  embarked  on  an  extensive-  but  still
thoroughly  paternalist  -  program of  ‘upliftment’  of  farm workers  and their  families,
initially rooted in the Western Cape, but gradually spreading to other parts of the country
(Mayson,  1990).  Funded  as  a  rural  welfare  and  social  development  initiative  by  the
apartheid  government,  conservative  overseas  donors  and  farmers  themselves, its
programmes addressed alcoholism and other forms of ‘social  pathology’  on the farm.
‘Community’ or ‘liaison committees’ consisting of worker representatives served as the
main vehicle towards this end. The Foundation appealed to farmers to train workers in a
more systematic fashion and to ‘improve’ labour relations. Formal contracts were drawn
up and ‘farm rules’  were  formalised,  sometimes accompanied by the introduction of
grievance  and  disciplinary  procedures.  Farmers  were  also  encouraged  to  improve
amenities for workers. This often went far beyond housing : in the late 1980s, the typical
RF member farm would have a ‘community hall’ or ‘TV room’ for workers, crèches for
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farm worker children and even sports fields. In all these efforts the RF was assisted by the
KWV, the National Productivity Institute (NPI) and the Western Cape Agricultural Union.
The initiative neatly highlighted the overarching objectives of the new approach to farm
labour : ‘upliftment’ would not only reduce social costs, but also improve productivity
and the poor image of the industry in the face of looming sanctions (Mayson, 1990).
12 In the event, the efforts of the RF did not succeed in staving off sanctions. Neither did it
succeed in creating the committed, contented workers its proponents hoped for. Part of
the reason is that the reforms themselves were hopelessly compromised. Like the broader
racial order itself,  the racialized power relations of white mastery were never up for
debate : at most, the Rural Foundation tried to regularise and modernise them. This in
itself produced new problems. Worker empowerment was always limited and provisional
– and so, by the same token, was the degree of assent the new forms of management
could command. Rather than create a new kind of wine farm worker - motivated, skilled
and content - the reforms created a new layer of black supervisors, insecure in their
power and caught uncomfortably between the resentment of rank and file workers and
the demands of farm management (Du Toit, 1998). These reforms, far from transforming
on-farm practice created at  most  a  kind of  ‘neo-paternalism (Ewert  et  Hamman) –  a
hybrid  formation  in  which  elements  of  modern  and  paternalist  farm  management
existed, sometimes uncomfortably, side by side.
13 In the long run, the Rural Foundation’s attempt to bring paternalism into the twenty-first
century faltered. With the transition to democracy the site and stakes of the political
game altered. The project of preserving-by-sanitising the racial order of the paternalist
farm was marginalised by the democratic transition and its promises of land reform,
agricultural restructuring, democratisation and the decisive expansion of labour law, and
the  new  government  was  in  any  case  not  interested  in  continuing  to  support  an
institution it  saw as  a  product  of  Apartheid reformism (Pers Comm.,  Herman Bailey,
2003-11-27.) Facing termination of its funding, the Rural Foundation tried to reposition
itself as a role player in land reform and rural development and eventually renamed itself
the ‘Centre for Integrated Rural Development’ ; in the process, however, it lost much of
its support among white farmers. The network of community organisations, crèches and
liaison committees it had brought into being mostly withered on the vine. They limp on
in only a few districts, kept alive by the efforts of progressive farmers.
14 Regulation in the South African wine industry lasted from 1918 to 1995. The lynchpin of
the  system  was  the  KWV  established  in  1918.  After  numerous  protestations  to
government in the 1910s, the latter eventually gave in to grape growers’ demands for a
regulatory system in order  to  prevent  the destabilising effects  of  periodic  surpluses.
Armed with statutory powers the KWV not only set planting quotas for each and every
grower, but was also charged with ‘surplus removal’ against a guaranteed minimum price
per ton of grapes. Until 1993, the KWV was also the sole exporter of South African wine.
In the latter half of the century a cosy relationship developed between the wine farming
lobby of the Cape and the ruling National Party in which votes were traded for elaborate
regulation and protection. Although the latter never included direct subsidies, farmers
benefited from financial loans with interest rates below market price. The authoritarian
racial state also saw to it that rightless farm labour was kept in check and cheap.
15 The first step towards deregulation of the wine industry was taken in 1989. This came in
the  wake  of  deregulation  in  agriculture  in  general  which  had  already  begun in  the
mid-1980s. Deregulation in the wine industry itself started with the abolition of the quota
How competitive is South Africa ? Advances and challenges in the transformati...
Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer, 231-232 | 2005
4
system and culminated in the removal of the minimum price in the mid-1990s. With the
termination of trade sanctions against South African and the opening of external markets
in 1993, the need for a minimum price effectively fell away. Since then the centre of
gravity in the industry has effectively shifted away from the KWV to processors and
marketers on the downstream side of the value chain. In 1998 the KWV itself converted
into a company.
16 While the private cellars generally welcomed deregulation, the shock this represented to
many a co-op farmer cannot be underestimated.  Not only had they lost  the political
kingdom and direct access to the state, but also their whole wine industry comfort zone,
including cheap loans, cheap labour and a guaranteed income. Not only did workers now
have the vote and labour rights, but there were no longer any automatic takers for their
wine. For the first time farmers and cellar management had to actively market and sell
their  wine  themselves.  No  wonder  that  even  in  the  late  1990s  many  co-op  farmers
thought back to the days of regulation with nostalgia.
17 When sanctions were lifted and worlds markets opened themselves up to South African
wine  farmers  (in  1993),  the  reaction  was  mixed.  On  the  one  hand  a  wealth  of
opportunities  presented themselves,  but  on the  other  farmers  literally  entered terra
incognito. Most co-op managers knew nothing about marketing, branding, supply chains
or where to pitch the price of their wines. Having awoken from a long sleep like Rip van
Winkel, they knew nothing about international wine markets or the trends at work.
18 Given its history, the industry came face to face with enormous challenges in the early
1990s. These challenges need to be very clearly understood. Today it is a truism in the
South African wine industry that ‘the future’ lies in re-orienting production away from
bulk wine and developing the ability to produce for the quality market (Spies, 2001). Like
most truisms,  it  is  in equal parts fundamentally correct and seriously oversimplified.
Wine is never just wine, grapes are never just grapes, and the implications of ‘the demand
for  quality’  differ  from context  to  context.  The  global  alcoholic  beverage  market  is
fragmented and complex and the markets for South African wines and wine grapes are no
exception.
19 Three linked trends in the international alcoholic beverage market and its commodity
systems have played a particularly important role. Firstly the global beverage industry
has increasingly come under pressure, partly because of the global economic downturn
and partly because of increasing health concerns among consumers. Secondly, the wine
market  has  been increasingly  affected  by  the  growth of  supermarket  wine  retailers,
which have fundamentally changed the way in which wine is consumed and marketed.
This  is  closely  linked to  the  third trend,  which is  the  increasing prominence in  the
premium and super premium 4 wine market of branded wines promising to deliver not
only quality but also consistency.
20 Together,  these  trends  have  meant  that  wine  markets  have  been  characterised  by
increasingly divergent price trends. Low-priced blended table wines have poor prospects
in a world where consumption has fallen by a quarter since 1982. In France and Italy – the
bastions of working class wine drinking - consumption has halved in the past thirty years.
At the same time there is a global trend towards buying better-quality wines (Rachman,
1999). While wine sales at lower price points have remained stagnant, higher price points
have shown buoyant growth. At the turn of the new century the most lucrative price
bracket was at over 4 pounds sterling in Britain and $ 7 in the USA. In the latter market,
wines selling at more than $ 7 account for only 22 % of sales by volume, but almost 50 % of
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revenues. As The Economist put it in a recent survey of the international wine industry :
‘… [The message is clear : the best place is at the upper end of the market, where growth
is fastest and margins are fattest] (Rachman, 1999).
21 The most important international wine market is Western Europe, where 70 % of the
world’s wines are still  made and consumed. Within this region, Britain is particularly
important for premium wine exporters. Unlike the parochial market of France, where
imports command less than 5 % of  premium wine consumption,  Britain is  the fourth
largest wine market and world’s biggest importer of wine – and supermarket retailers are
particularly prominent here. Supermarkets distribute over 60 % of all wine consumed in
the UK 5. The main beneficiary of this trend has been Australia, which has pioneered the
industrialisation of premium branded wine production ; while France has traditionally
had the biggest share of the British market, Australia’s share of the UK wine market has
risen from 8 % to 15 % between 1993 and 1999, while 7 of the top selling wine brands in
the UK in 2001 were Australian.
22 South African wines have also made important inroads into this market. After the lifting
of sanctions, exports increased by 1 000 % between 1994 and 1997, although this was from
a very low base (Ewert et al., 1998). In 2002 South Africa was the fastest growing wine
country in the UK. It held its market share in the UK in 2003 - despite ferocious price
cutting from Australia and California (Wineland, March 2004, p. 29). For the first time the
country had a brand listed in the top five wines retailed in the UK with ‘Kumala’  at
number four 6. Also for the first time South African wine averaged a price of five Pounds
per bottle. In 2004 market share stood at just over 10 %.
23 This growth has contradictory implications for wine makers. The most important buyers
of South African in Britain are Britain’s eight big supermarket chains. To land a sales
contract with one of them is a much sought after prize in the Western Cape wine lands
(especially  for  co-operative  cellars).  But  while  these  new  markets  mean  new
opportunities,  they  also  mean  tougher  bargaining.  Supermarkets  have  stringent
purchasing practices. They impose strict phytosanitary and technical requirements on
suppliers and – through projects like the Ethical Training Initiative - are increasingly
looking  to  impose  ethical  requirements  as  well  (Du  Toit,  2002).  Those  who  cannot
conform to these threshold requirements risk being left out of this market altogether.
24 So, although South African growers and cellars are starting to learn the rules of the ‘new
competition’ life is not going to get easier. Many co-op cellars struggle to sell their wine
and  are  heavily  indebted.  In  this  scenario,  competition  between  wine-producing
countries and between individual producers is bound to intensify. Much will depend on
the ability to establish ‘branded’ wines that stand out from the rest. This requires not
only the ability to make good wine, but also the ability to deliver consistency and volume
at the same time. To build a brand in the UK, for instance, requires the ability to bring 3
to 6 million litres to the market per year, and to support it through strong advertising
and an efficient logistical supply operation (Loubser, 2001, p. 36).
25 These  trends  are  particularly  significant  given  that  the  most  important  growth
opportunities for South African wine remain in these overseas markets. In the context of
the South African beverage industry as a whole, wine has done relatively well and the
market for table wines and lower end premium wines blended in bulk has remained
healthy  (Alcoholic  Beverage  Review,  2002).  These  markets,  however,  show  scant
opportunity for growth. And, more to the point, there is very little money in them for
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grape growers. Bulk wines, after all, can now be sourced internationally, and even South
African stalwarts such as ‘Tassenberg’ include wine made from Argentinean grapes.
26 Survival is not made any easier by the fact that globalisation is a two-way street. In 2002
South  Africa  imported  approximately  31 million  litres  of  ‘natural  wine’  compared  to
approximately 216 million litres of exports (SAWIS,  2003,  p. 26).  While most imported
premium wine remains unaffordable for all but the wealthiest section of South African
society, it is the import of bulk blending and distilling wine that is impacting the most on
South African co-operative wineries, many of whom came to rely on the product for the
greater part of their existence. As a result, these growers and cellars were often poorly
prepared for the new environment to which they awoke in the mid-1990s. At that stage,
less  than  20 %  of  South  Africa’s  good  wine  production  qualified  for  the  “HP”  price
category.  Also,  the  industry  had  become  almost  exclusively  oriented  towards  the
domestic market. Having neither the know-how, nor the confidence to compete in Europe
on a big scale, the industry found it difficult to venture into foreign domains. This is
especially true for the co-operative sector.
27 The third important dimension of change relates to national democratisation. Again, the
periodization of  this  shift  is  complex.  Moves  to  bring farm workers  into the fold of
modern industrial relations started well before 1994, but the coming into power of an
African National Congress (ANC) government deepened and accelerated these trends. A
veritable slew of legislation was passed, providing for a wide range of labour, social and
land rights,  ranging from basic  conditions  of  labour  in  1993  to  the  promulgation of
minimum wages in 2003 7. A paternalist state has stepped in to push back the paternalist
authority of the farmer, and has created new limits to farmers’ control over workers’
lives.8 These  changes  seriously  challenge  the  legal  and  formal  underpinnings  of
traditional farm paternalism.
28 But  challenging  paternalism  is  not  the  same  as  replacing  it.  There  is  considerable
evidence  that  many  farmers  are  reluctant  to  comply  with  labour  legislation,  if  not
downright hostile to it (Kleinbooi et Hall, 2001). Most farmers may comply with the main
provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) (e.g. hours of work, leave
and  holiday  provisions),  but  there  is  widespread  reluctance  to  implement  the
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), the Employment Equity Act (EEA), and the Skills
Development Act (SDA) (Sunde et Kleinbooi, 1999), and it remains to be seen whether
enforcement of minimum wages is going to be any better than over the last ten years.
Weaknesses in the legislation9,  a small inspectorate, huge caseloads and a shortage of
Commission  for  Conciliation,  Mediation  and  Arbitration  (CCMA)  commissioners
compound the problem.
29 Thus, though labour law has significantly disrupted the institutional order of paternalist
labour management, it has not decisively transformed it. The state is far away and lacks
the ability to enforce its own laws. Farm workers find that insisting on their rights can be
a dangerous strategy,  and know that  maintaining patronage relationships  may be as
important. The result on the ground is a complex palimpsest in which labour
relationships are simultaneously governed both by the formal codes of legislation and by
the  personal  relationships  and  implicit  contracts  of  paternalist practices  (Flensted-
Jensen, 2002).
30 In addition, farmers are changing the nature of the battleground. Though labour law has
curtailed their power, they have retained the ability to restructure their business on their
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own terms. This results in trends that could make labour law irrelevant in important
sectors – and that pose important challenges to traditional forms of worker organisation.
10
31 How growers are affected by these changes depends partly on how they are located
within the agro-commodity system. Not everyone is well positioned to take advantage of
the growing market for premium and export wines. One important obstacle is geography :
generally speaking, wine grape farmers in the hotter regions face serious disadvantages
in trying to break into the quality market. A second factor is the historical bias in existing
plantings toward high yielding cultivars unsuitable for the production of quality wines.
32 The latter has been changing.  Between 1990 and 1997,  the absolute area under wine
grapes expanded at an annual rate of 1 %, while the gross tons produced increased by 2 %
per annum over the same period (Ewert et al, 1998, p. 25). In 2002 the total area under
vines amounted to 107 998 hectares and the total  tonnage pressed to 1 079 875 (Pers.
Comm., Gerard Martin, SAWIS, 3 October 2003). Most of the new plantings involved the
so-called ‘noble’ varieties, i.e. Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot, Pinotage, Shiraz, Sauvignon
Blanc and Chardonnay. In 2002,  noble cultivars represented 40,5 % 11 of  all  plantings,
compared to only 13.8 % in 1991. In 2002 wine processed from the six noble varieties
represented 25 % of  all  ‘natural  wine’  exports (Pers.  Comm. Gerard Martin,  SAWIS,  3
October 2003)
33 Red wine production increased from 10.9 % of all grapes pressed in 1992 to 21 % in 2002.
In 2004 40 % of all vineyards were planted under red grapes, compared to 15 % in 1991
(The Platter Wine Guide, 2005, p. 6)
34 Although standard cultivars like Chenin Blanc and Colombar continue to dominate South
African vineyards 12, the shift towards noble grapes signifies a considerable investment on
the part of growers, with establishment costs amounting to approximately R 70 000 13 per
hectare (in 2003) 14. This is one of the reasons why a bigger percentage of noble cultivars
are to be found on estate and private cellar farms. While co-operative cellars are still
responsible for approximately 70 % of total production (i.e. volume), the estate/private
cellar sector commands a bigger share of the high quality wine output. Producing more
quality and adding value to it, remains the biggest single challenge of the co-operative
wineries.
35 However, the rapid expansion of new plantings and the shift to noble cultivars are not
being matched by the equally rapid adoption of new vineyard practices. In a study of 104
co-op farmers in 1997, only a minority reported that they had changed or adjusted their
vineyard practices over the previous ten years (Ewert et al, 1998, p. 35) 15. Four years on,
the strategic study into the wine industry highlighted the inefficient transfer of know-
how from research institution to the farm16.  Especially in the co-operative sector the
adoption of new practices and the training of workers is a major cause of concern.
36 But there are further problems. The unleashing of market forces among grape growers
and the revival of the tendency to ‘plant after the price’ reintroduces important elements
of instability. During the late 1990s, when red wine grapes were in short supply, farmers
could command good prices for quality Shiraz and Cabernet Sauvignon grapes. As more
and more farmers joined the bandwagon, prices dropped. Increasingly, growers of wine
grapes  are  at  the mercy those further  downstream in the value chain.  Though high
margins will be possible for some, many growers will face tightening quality, “ethical”
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and phytosanitary standards, increasing pressure on their margins and increasing levels
of risk.
37 The second important dimension of change is local industry de- and re-regulation. In the
1990s, the South African wine industry entered a period of major flux. Political transition
has  removed  the  privileged  status  of  the  wine  industry  and  farmers’  lobbies.  The
measures that protected farmers from competitive pressures have been removed, and old
alliances have been cracked by new opportunities and new markets.  The wine grape
commodity  system is  being  restructured  in  complex  and  contradictory  ways  –  with
significant consequences for growers.
38 Firstly,  traditional  industry  power  relations  are  being  reshaped  by  processes  of
globalization,  deregulation and legislative  change.  Moves  to  amend liquor  legislation
have signalled to the producing wholesalers that  their  competitive stranglehold over
retail would no longer be tolerated (Hoe SA Brou…, 1998, p. 79) – while the increasing
importance of local supermarket wine retailing is causing a rethink in ‘trade’ strategy
anyway. Consolidation in the international drinks industry – particularly through the
merger  of  Grandmet and Guiness  to  form of  industry giant  Diageo –  has  called into
question many of the historic arrangements around distribution rights for international
liquor brands (Bet your Glass…, 2000, p. 30-32). South Africa’s producing wholesalers, for
many years the biggest frogs in a very small pond, are themselves increasingly vulnerable
to international and local competitive pressure.
39 Two distinct trends seem to be taking shape. On the one hand, there are clear moves
toward  concentration and integration (e.g.  the  merger  of  Distillers  and Stellenbosch
Farmers  Winery  to  form  Distell,  South  Africa’s  second  largest  alcoholic  beverage
company,  and the alliance between Stellenbosch Vineyards and Australian-based BRL
Hardy).  At  the same time there is  significant diversification,  with an increase in the
numbers of independent wine makers and cellars. Private cellars and independent labels
are proliferating 17. Their number has increased from 105 in 1998 to 185 in 2001 ; in 2002
alone 33 more cellars were registered (Alcoholic Beverage Review 2002). Some of these
numbers  are  the  result  of  estates  de-listing,  in  order  to  have  more  freedom in  the
sourcing  of  grapes.  Others  represent  co-operative  cellars  that  have  transformed
themselves into private companies.
40 Since 1998, indeed, the number of co-operatives has fallen from 69 to 50. Of those that
have ‘disappeared’ two have gone bankrupt 18, while the others have undergone mergers
and/or changed into companies. If the survivors want to escape the more pessimistic
scenario, more may be forced to pool their resources 19. A study of 28 co-operative and
former  co-operative  cellars  showed  that  only  five  had  retained  their  traditional  co-
operative status and structure. All  others were in a process of transformation – with
regard to both their internal and their external organization (Martin, p. 74 - 75).
41 The implications of these shifts are complex and uneven, but together they seem to signal
an important shift in the power relations between growers, cellars and retailers.  One
particularly important development is the coming into being of a complex new internal
market in both wine and grapes. With the development of new branded premium wines
(e.g. ‘Arniston Bay’) that are not linked to particular vineyards, cellars that can produce
premium wine according to desired specifications have a wider range of possible buyers
for their products than before. Similarly there is a much more dynamic market for wine
grapes. A part of both these markets are driven simply by quality and price, but many
brand  owners,  cellars  and  growers  also  tend  to  prefer  entering  into  medium-term
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relationships in order to avoid uncertainty (Interviews with Distell staffers André Steyn,
27-11-2001 and Ernst Le Roux, 11-12-2001). Increasingly, staying in these relationships
depends  on  the  ability  to  produce  grapes  and/or  wines  that  conform  to  precisely
specified ‘quality’ and other standards.
42 The result is a complex and shifting new strategic terrain. Cellars are exploring a wide
range of different routes through trial and error and incremental changes. Some co-ops
have chosen to remain in a medium to long-term contractual relationship with domestic
producing wholesalers, while others have embarked on their own marketing and sales. In
the study referred to above (Martin), the co-ops in ‘evergreen’ contracts with wholesalers
sold all their production on the domestic market, 70 % of which in bulk (i.e. non-value
added). ‘Self-marketing’ co-operatives, on the other hand, were exporting an average of
5 % of their output 20. Between 3 and 20 % of their domestic sales went directly into the
retail market. Although small, they seem to have made some headway in their effort to
gain more independence from the ‘trade’ (i.e. the wholesalers). Another important trend
is specialisation :  there are moves afoot in the industry to nudge the remaining co-
operatives into the direction of  increasing specialisation on a product  basis  (e.g.  red
wines) (Pers. Comm. Eben Archer, Department of Viticulture, University of Stellenbosch,
21-5-2003).
43 None of these shifts are easily accomplished. New and emerging sales strategies often
require or presuppose organisational changes. The transition from co-operative to firm
entails shifting power relations in grower-cellar relationships at district level, and brings
power  struggles  between co-op management  and growers  that  are  not  always  easily
resolved. It is often hard to ‘engineer’ the transition – particularly in a context where
recalcitrant members can veto changes that challenge established practices.
44 The  increasing  pressure  on  farmers’  margins  and  their  increasing  levels  of  risk  has
important consequences for workers. Even in the relatively prosperous wine industry,
many farmers are reacting angrily to the state’s attempts to intervene in ‘their’ affairs.
Minimum wages in particular caused huge protests in certain quarters of the organized
farming  lobby  (Ommekeer…2003  ;  Minister..,  2003).  Formal  protest,  however,  is  not
farmers’  most  significant  response.  Facing  a  sustained  challenge  to  their  power  as
employers, and feeling increasing competitive pressures, many farmers seem to be opting
for the one measure that still is within their power : restructuring their businesses. Many
seem to be resorting to casualization, externalization and contractualization 21, deepening
an already segmented labour market and further deepening the divide between ‘winners’
and ‘losers’ 22.
45 In the first years after democratisation, evidence on employment trends seemed mixed.
While the initial post-sanction years still recorded an increase in aggregate employment,
this trend may have started to change in the late 1990s. In 1997, both industry figures and
academic research recorded an increase over the previous four years.  While industry
figures cited a 7 % increase (SAWIS, 1998 ; 1994), a survey of 104 farms in 1997, revealed a
5 %  rise  in  permanent  employment.  In  1997,  farmers  also  estimated  that  ‘their’
permanent labour force would grow by an additional 3 % until the year 2002. The same
estimate was made for casual labour (Ewert et al, 1998). The trends in wine were backed
up by Agricultural Census figures (1996) which showed that the Western Cape, together
with  Mpumalanga,  were  the  only  provinces  to  show  an  increase  in  agricultural
employment. The fact that agriculture in both provinces was inserted into the export
sector played a major part.
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46 Trends may have started shifting, however. The above mentioned survey was done in
1997, shortly after the restructuring of the co-operatives sector had begun in all earnest
(i.e. in 1995-1996) and during a huge upsurge in new plantings. Four years later, however,
another survey of 77 wine, fruit and vegetable farms in six districts of the Western Cape
suggested an uneven but noticeable trend away from permanent farm employment (Du
Toit  et  Ally,  2004).  These  trends  were  more pronounced on deciduous  fruit  growing
farms, but they were still present on wine farms. Almost 60 % of farms in the survey (and
more than 54 % of wine farms) had reduced the size of the permanent labour force in the
previous 3 years, and on almost half (and 41 % of the wine farms sampled), management
indicated plans to reduce permanent labour in future. For the most part, jobs were not
being replaced by machines, but by casual labour, with strong shifts towards the use of
labour contractors and casual workers, and a distinct trend towards the use of women
workers (Du Toit et Ally, 2004, p. 15-16 ; Barrientos, 2001).
47 In addition, significant numbers of white farmers seemed to be walking away from the
‘social  responsibility’  functions they have traditionally been held to have in terms of
paternalist ideology. Key here was the withdrawal from the provision of housing to farm
workers. Some 57 % of farmers reported having at least one empty house on the farm,
with this  figure  reaching 83 % in  some districts.  Less  than a  quarter  of  respondents
indicated that they planned to continue renovating existing housing stock, and almost a
third of farmers (32 % of the whole sample, and 33 % of wine farmers) were considering
abandoning their ‘traditional’ housing function altogether (Du Toit et Ally, 2004, p. 22).
48 The increasing employment of casual labour is paralleled by the rising introduction of
mechanical  grape  harvesters 23.  Grape  harvesters  represent  important  advantages  for
farmers. Not only do they represent a significant reduction in labour costs - one machine
may replace as many at 70 workers per 12 hour shift (Pers. Comm. Johan Botha, vineyard
manager,  Fairview  Cellar,  Paarl,  28-5-2003)  -  but  they  also  offer  important  quality
advantages, enabling farmers to harvest quickly when sugar levels are right, or at night
to make sure grapes are cool. In 1995 a total of 95 machines were recorded for the whole
industry. A year later this figure already stood at 144 - an increase of 52 %. In the 1997
survey of 104 farms, 36 % of producers made use of mechanical harvesters (Ewert et al,
1998). Diffusion may have slowed down, but there is no reason to believe that it has come
to a halt 24.
49 Whether ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’ labour market, an important feature of both is their
local nature, in a geographical and in a racial sense. The permanent labour force is almost
exclusively coloured and predominantly male,  with very few African workers gaining
entry to the ‘core’ (Ewert and Hamman ; Du Toit and Ally, 2004, p. 12.). Most permanent
workers have either grown up on the farm where they are employed or originate from
the immediate vicinity of the workplace. More often than not, they are recruited through
a network of relatives and friends already working on the farm. The ‘internal labour
market’ is one of the reasons for the low presence of African workers in the permanent
labour force. Other reasons are cultural and political. Farmers often cite their inability to
communicate in Xhosa and possible friction between Africans and coloured workers as
the main reasons for not employing more black workers. Another reason may be the
perception that African workers are more militant and inclined towards unionisation.
Studies show that this perception is not totally unwarranted. At cellars the presence of
African workers is much stronger than at farm level.  Here union density is relatively
high 25.
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50 The employment pattern is similar in the case of casual and contract workers. Although
the female dependents of permanent (coloured) farm workers, women from neighbouring
farms and nearby towns continue to form an important part of the casual labour force,
African workers - both men and women – have an increasingly strong profile in this
labour market. In some regions, especially close to Cape Town, teams of contract workers
consist much more predominantly of Xhosa speakers (Ewert and Hamman ; Du Toit and
Ally, 2004).
51 Increasing levels of casualization and externalisation have serious consequences for rural
livelihoods. Asset poverty means that poor households in the new peri-urban settlements
around Western Cape towns in the farming districts lack direct access to land and the
other  resources  required  for  either  household  food  production  or  independent
entrepreneurial activity. Unemployment is rife, and in many regions and rural towns,
livelihoods are cobbled together from state welfare grants and cash from seasonal and
casual employment (Du Toit, 2004). In the rural Western Cape, that means farm work. The
move  off-farm  does  not  end  the  dependence  on  the  agro-food  sector,  and  in  the
winelands, the eight week vintage period presents a crucial window for supplementing
cash incomes. Women, young people and new migrants are particularly insecure in the
search for work. On any given day, there are many more work seekers than the farmer
needs. In scenes reminiscent of ‘Grapes of Wrath’ the farmer or his foreman can pick and
choose amongst those clambering to get onto the lorry for a day’s wages. Under these
circumstances,  casuals  are  unlikely  candidates  for  unions  –  not  as  ordinary  paid-up
members, let alone the vanguard.
52 The big challenge : building trust and social capital
53 While the South African wine industry has changed considerably over the last decade or
so, it needs to overcome a number of stiff challenges if it wants to sustain and improve on
its recent success. There is a consensus in the industry on two things : one, that it won’t
survive  as  a  commodity  industry,  and  secondly,  that  its  future  lies  in  international
markets.  In  other  words,  it  needs  to  produce  better  quality  wines  and  enhance  its
international competitiveness. Given these imperatives, it needs to improve on a number
of things :
• Become more market-driven
• Production needs to become more terroir based
• Develop efficient supply chains
• Source capital
• Develop a volume capacity
• Build a change management capacity
• Develop its human resource and skills base
• Advance black empowerment
• Build trust and social capital
54 While this  may appear as  a  disparate list  of  urgent ‘things to do’  the golden thread
running through all of this is the need for innovation. Now Michael Porter argues that
this can be had in one fell swoop if there is a ‘cluster’ in place (see note 3). Clusters,
according  to  him,  matter  –  even  in  the  days  of  globalisation.  Moreover  ‘…enduring
competitive advantages in a global economy lie increasingly in local things – knowledge,
relationships,  motivation  –  that  distant  rivals  cannot  match’.  In  today’s  world
competitive advantage does not rest on inputs as such, but ‘…on making more productive
use of inputs, which requires continuous innovation’.
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55 Clusters are critical to competition, because they increase productivity, drive innovation
and stimulate the formation of new businesses. At their best they ‘promote competition
and cooperation’ and ‘foster better coordination and trust (Porter, 1998, p. 79 - 80).
56 ‘Poor countries’ Porter goes on to argue ‘lack well-developed clusters, and compete with
cheap labour and natural resources instead’.
57 This is not the case in South Africa. The South African wine industry neither lacks a
cluster, nor is the latter under-developed. For years it has had nurseries for rootstock,
firms  that  produce  winemaking  equipment 26,  educational,  research  and  trade
organisations, advertising firms and institutions that exercise quality control.
58 The problem lies elsewhere. The cluster has been too inward looking and ‘low trust’. For
the most of  its modern,  20 th century history the industry was oriented towards the
domestic market, both unwilling and unable to compete internationally. Except for a very
brief period in the 1980s, it was never cut off from new technology produced in the ‘old
world’  wine  countries  of  Europe.  If  there  was  a  ‘technological  discontinuity’,  it  was
because the co-op cellars saw no need for new equipment. The existing technology, like
the cluster  as  a  whole,  served them well  in  what  was  essentially  a  mass  production
market and uncritical domestic demand conditions. Production oriented and fixated on
the local market, hardly anybody took notice of changing trends in overseas markets.
Where growers wanted to introduce new varieties 27, for instance, the KWV used its legal
powers and stepped in. Overconsolidation, groupthink, and government protection did
the rest.
59 However, ‘navel gazing’ was not the only problem. Contrary to what the theory suggests,
deep fault  lines  of  distrust  have  run through the  industry  cluster  over  many years.
Although from the outside the pre-1994 South African wine industry may look like an
unholy alliance of white society, this is a somewhat oversimplified view. All these years
there have been at least three lines of division : firstly, between the co-operative sector
and the ‘trade’ (i.e. producing wholesalers). The latter never liked the minimum price per
litre,  arguing  that  it  was  artificially  high.  From  the  outset  they  agitated against  it
relentlessly. Secondly, between the co-operatives and the private cellars. Especially from
the 1970s onwards the latter experienced KWV regulation as a constraint,  preventing
them from innovation in production and marketing.  Thirdly,  between white owners/
employers on the one hand and black employees on the other. Astoundingly as it may
sound, no black employee progressed beyond the position of farm/cellar ‘foreman’ until
recently. Even after a history of almost 350 years the South African wine industry did not
have  a  single  black  manager  or  winemaker,  let  alone  farm  owner  or  businessman.
Whether on the farm or in the cellar, relationships between employer and worker were
defined by the peculiar nature of paternalism – authoritarian, contradictory, violent, and
no genuine trust.
60 So,  whilst  the  cluster  did  not  dissipate  after  deregulation,  it  lacked  some  crucial
ingredients, i.e. trust and coordination. Cut loose, many a coop cellar was in real danger
of going under. It was because of this that remnants of the old establishment started to
promote the idea of a ‘strategy’ for the industry. Thus was born ‘Vision 2020’ a strategic
analysis of future ‘options’ for the industry. Its message was clear : South Africa needs to
produce  better  quality  wine  if  the  industry  is  to  survive  in  a  fiercely  competitive
international market. ‘Better quality’ was defined as branded wine in the ‘premium’ and
‘super premium’ price categories.
How competitive is South Africa ? Advances and challenges in the transformati...
Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer, 231-232 | 2005
13
61 Flowing directly from the recommendations of the study, the industry established a new
institution,  the ‘South African Wine and Brandy Co.’  (SAWB).  It  is  a corporatist  body
ostensibly representing the main stakeholders in the industry, i.e. growers, cellars, labour
and the ‘trade’. Officially its brief is to help create an industry that is ‘vibrant, united,
non-racial and prosperous’ (SAWB, 2003). The core objectives of its ‘Wine Industry Plan’
(WIP) are defined as ‘competitiveness’ ‘equity’ (i.e. ‘empowerment’) and ‘sustainability’. If
one takes the generous view, one could argue that the SAWB could fill the vacuum of
coordination left by the ‘anarchy’ of radical deregulation. The pessimistic take is that it is
still  heavily  staffed  by  representatives  of  the  old  establishment  and  hardly  has  the
capacity to play the innovative role expected of it.
62 Whatever the view, in reality ‘empowerment’ has shifted right to the top of the SAWB’s
agenda. This is not least because the government has made it so. In terms of its own
definition of ‘empowerment’ government expects all sectors and all firms in the South
African economy to increase its  share of  black ownership and black participation in
decisionmaking. The wine industry is no exception. As a result, the SAWB had to put
matters like land reform and skills training on the back burner and produce a ‘Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE) Charter’ for the industry.
63 Any such charter faces the challenge of balancing and reconciling numerous different
agendas – not least being very different models of what ‘Black economic empowerment’
could be. The expectations of middle class Black South Africans who hope to buy into
opportunities to share the profits of the industry will have to be balanced against the
demands of those arguing that workers should be included in broad-based empowerment.
This issue aside, the SAWB does not have much in the way of either ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ by
which it can prod firms in the desired direction.
64 And that is not all. The SAWB’s formidable task is not made any easier by the fact that the
organisation itself has become a battleground. Members of the black empowerment lobby
(consisting mainly of businessmen and unionists) at the SAWB have given notice that they
want to restructure the body towards a ‘more equitable’ distribution of power. They may
even withdraw co-operation until they have captured other ‘commanding heights’ of the
industry. Should this be the case, it may in fact put on hold the more economic, technical
and training dimensions of transformation.
65 The stand off at the SAWB highlights an unresolved problem of the South African wine
industry even after ten years of change, viz. the lack of trust between the power holders
and the ‘historically disadvantaged’. For a decade the power question could be avoided,
but  now the  history  of  the  industry  has  caught  up  with  it.  Many  of  the  industry’s
challenges will be more easily solved if the divisions of the past can be overcome and
social  capital  be  build  instead.  However,  there  is  no  route  to  social  capital  past
empowerment.
66 While a kind of paralysis persists at the SAWB, farmers and cellars have to go on and
make do. However, also at this level, the response is not straightforward. While some
experience  Black  Economic  Empowerment  (BEE)  as  a  ‘nuisance’  that  distracts
unnecessarily from the ‘core business’ of farming and winemaking, others have reacted
more positively and even with enthusiasm. Generally speaking these are the co-operative
cellars that have managed the whole transition more successfully and are commercially
well placed. They view BEE as an opportunity to build trust and may have the additional
benefit of a capital injection.
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67 Those cellars that engage with BEE half-heartedly and with resentment, are the ones that
have been struggling all along. In their view, BEE may just be the proverbial straw that
breaks the camel’s back. Poorly placed in the market and heavily indebted, they may not
attract black empowerment partners anyway. Marginalised and with no help in sight
from either government or the SAWB, they may find it hard to survive.
68 Over the last ten years the South African wine industry has made remarkable strides,
given its closed, racialised, productionist history. Although more by trial and error than
anything  approximating  a  coherent  ‘strategy’  South  African  wines  have  successfully
penetrated international markets, including the all-important British one. Everywhere
market share is growing. Spearheading the penetration are branded varietal wines in the
lower and higher premium price category.
69 However, success has not come to everybody in equal measure. In fact, deregulation and
internationalisation have created a situation of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. This is the result of
an inward looking wine cluster which provided ample security and placed co-operative
cellars on a mass production trajectory which many find difficult abandon.
70 It is mainly for this reason that the industry, after several years of neo-liberal laissez
faire, decided to establish new institutions whose job it is to assist in the transformation.
However, transformation in South Africa is not only a financial and technical affair. It is
very much a political one as well. The state expects the wine industry to transform into
the direction of  ‘black economic empowerment’  (BEE).  Where cellars  are well  placed
financially and where BEE is  approached in a positive spirit,  this  should not  impede
competitiveness. On the other hand, where BEE is done grudgingly and where the cellar is
saddled with debt, they will not easily attract BEE partners. This will trigger sanctions
and  marginalize  them further  –  to  the  point  where  no  new age  ‘quality  cluster’  or
industry institution will be able to save them.
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NOTES
1.. Michael Porter (1998, p. 77-90) defines clusters as “geographic concentrations of
interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field”.
2.. A huge co-op and regulator at the same time.
3.. For an example from the fruit farming regions, see A. du Toit, ‘2003. 
4.. The South African beverage industry distinguishes ‘good wine’ into ‘Standard Price’
(SP), ‘Medium Price’(MP) and ‘High Price’(HP) categories. SP wine is essentially good wine
of the lowest quality - that sold at or below production costs in the infamous papsakke (foil
bags) and soft plastic bottles. MP wine is of slightly better quality and is often sold in two-
litre box format, while HP wine is often broadly categorised as anything in a 750 ml glass
bottle and/or with a cork (Beverage Business Yearbook 2002 : p. 121-123). Increasingly,
however, wine industry analysts follow Rabobank’s distinction of the wine market into
‘Basic’ ‘Premium’ ‘Super Premium’ ‘Ultra Premium’ and ‘Icon’ categories. These do not
refer simply to price points but also to the markets in which these wines compete. ‘Basic’
wine, comprising some 50 % of the international wine market, is anonymous, with little
or no linkage to vineyards or even countries. Premium wines comprise some 30 % of the
wine market : they are usually of better quality, often retail through the supermarkets in
the “value for money” market, and usually linked to distinct brand (rather than vineyard
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or cellar) identities. Super premium wines comprise about 10 % of the wine market and
sell on the basis of quality style and perceptions about their unique identity in the
market. Ultra premium wines are of highly distinctive and individual quality, and are not
marketed on a mass basis. Finally, Icon wines are those whose value is mainly linked to
the act of purchasing them. (See Loubser, 2001).
5.. The situation is similar in the Netherlands, South Africa’s second most important
market in Europe. In the USA 45 % of all wine is sold in supermarkets. (Rachman, 1999, p.
107).
6.. ‘KUMALA’ is marketed by the British firm Western Wines and blended from wines
sourced from a variety of Cape cellars.
7.. The most important pieces of legislation applicable to farm workers are: the Basic
Conditions of Employment Act, 1998 (‘the BCEA’) ; the Occupational Health and Safety Act
of 1993 (‘OHSA’) ; the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act of 1993
(‘COIDA’) ; the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘The LRA’) ; the Employment Equity Act 55
of 1998 (‘The EEA’) ; the Skills Development Act and Skills Development Levies Act (‘The
SDA’ and ‘the SDLA’): the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (‘ESTA’) ; the
Unemployment Insurance Act (‘UIF’): the Sectoral Determination 8: Farm Worker Sector:
the determination sets two categories of minimum wages, viz. R 800 p.m. or R 4.10 per
hour (for those working 27 heures or less per week) in ‘Areas A’ and R 650 p.m. or R 3.33
per hour in ‘Areas B’. The determination came into effect on the 1st of March 2003 and is
valid until 29 February 2004. The rates may then be increased.
8.. Dismissals, for instance, are no longer simply a matter of farmers’ prerogative.
Statistics for the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, Western Cape
show that of the 4801 disputes heard by CCMA commissioners in Western Cape
agriculture between November 1996 and October 2003, 67% were unfair dismissal
disputes, followed by ‘matters of mutual interest’ (7,9%), ‘unfair labour practices’ (6,2%)
and ‘organisational rights’ (3,5%). Statistics supplied by Anthea Edwards, CCMA head
office, Johannesburg, 6 October 2003.
9.. Especially with regard to the UIF, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA), EEA
and the Sectoral Determination.
10.. Expression used by the first chairman of the KWV, when warning farmers that
blindly ‘planting after the price of grapes’ would simply lead to yet another surplus.
11.. The percentage of new plantings may have been higher, were it not for conflicting
signals coming from the market: in the mid- to late 1990s relatively high prices for grape
juice concentrate and distilling wine were sustained, lulling some co-op managers and
farmers into a false sense of security and slowing down the shift to noble cultivars.
Towards the end of the decade, distilling wine prices dropped, driven down by cheap
imports.
12.. In 2002 they still represented 28,6% of all plantings. (SAWIS, 2003).
13.. Approximately 6000 British Pound Sterling at the current exchange rate.
14.. Personal communication, Chris Keet, winemaker at ‘Cordoba’ winery, Somerset-West,
28.5.03. The figure does not include the cost of land. On average, acquiring one hectare of
new land would add another R 120 000 to establishment costs.
15.. For instance, only 47% and 18% practiced trellising and ‘canopy control’ respectively.
16.. Personal communication, Prof. Leopold van Huyssteen, University of Stellenbosch,
who wrote a working paper on the question of technology transfer for Vision 2020, 6 May
2001.
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17.. In 2002 the structure of the industry was as follows : 4 501 primary producers (i.e.
grape growers), 50 co-operative cellars, 92 estates, 185 private cellars, 8 producing
wholesalers (Personal communication, Debbie Wait, SAWIS, 8.5.02).
18.. The cellars (without the farms of the former members) were snapped up by private
investors as a bargain.
19.21. The marginal co-ops face a classical Catch-22 situation: if they don’t succeed in
making the transition in time, the best farmers may leave to become private growers. If
the latter leave in significant numbers, it becomes ever more difficult for the co-op to
produce better wine and weather the storm. The situation is putting the solidarity of the
membership under enormous strain (see Chiffoleau,. et al., 2002).
20.. One former co-operative, now company, exported as much as 50 % of its production.
21.. ‘Casualization’ refers to a reduction in the size of the permanent labour force and
often an inversion of the ratio of permanent to casual workers. ‘Contractualization’ refers
to re-employment under less favourable circumstances. Externalization refers to the rise
of intermediaries like labour contractors and labour brokers.
22.. In the 20th century the labour market in the Cape wine industry has always been
segmented in the sense of a division between permanent and seasonal labour.
23.. The reasons are economic and political. In some regions various crops (e.g. fruit and
grapes) ripen simultaneously and harvesters are one way of addressing labour
bottlenecks. In other regions the fear of unions is extra strong and farmers are using
harvesters as a political weapon against possible organization.
24.. Farmers’ political fears played a role in the introduction of harvesters in the period
immediately after the 1994 election. When these proved to be unfounded, it may have
reduced the rate of adoption. However, this is merely a hunch. To our knowledge no
accurate diffusion studies were done after the mid-1990s.
25.. Important as it is, this may reflect the industrial organisation of the work process,
rather than the racial composition of the labour force. 
26.. It has to be said, however, that the more sophisticated, capital intensive technology
has always been imported from France, Italy and Germany.
27.. Such attempts at innovation came mostly from people in the private sector cellar,
hardly ever from co-op farmers. In the 1980s, the former increasingly ignored the law and
in this way foreshadowed the transformation of the 1990s.
RÉSUMÉS
Compétitivité mondiale et objectifs de la viti-viniculture au Cap (Afrique du Sud). Depuis le
milieu des années 1990, l’industrie viti-vinicole sud-africaine a connu une “triple transition” :
celle de la dérégulation sectorielle locale, celle de l’internationalisation, et celle des politiques de
démocratisation  et  de  réforme  juridique.Apparemment  la  filière  a  remarquablement  bien
répondu à ses nouveaux objectifs, mieux notablement dans le domaine des exportations où elle a
gagné des parts de marché significatives sur les marchés européens. Ses ventes ont aussi crû aux
États-Unis,  en Extrême-Orient et ailleurs dans le monde.Cependant ces succès à l’exportation
cachent une grande inégalité : d’une part se trouvent les viticulteurs, les caves et les grossistes
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qui sont capables de profiter des opportunités offertes par l’expansion internationale ; d’autre
part il y a ceux qui ne peuvent rien. Dans cette dernière catégorie se trouvent la plupart des
caves  coopératives  qui  ont  du  mal  à  assurer  la  transition.Cet  article  estime  que  cela  est
principalement  dû  aux  décennies  de  régulation  et  d’isolement  international.  De  nombreuses
coopératives  manquent  de  compétitivité  internationale,  non  parce  qu’il  n’y  a  pas  de
“groupemrnts (Clusters)” viticoles en Afrique du Sud dans le sens de la perspective utilisée par
M. Porter, mais parce que le groupement viticole est un “trust” faible qui n’a pas de perspectives
assez à long terme. Les nouvelles institutions ont été établies pour supporter les retardataires et
les tirer dans une nouvelle direction. Cependant, comme un effet du passé politique de l’Afrique
du Sud, les institutions elles-mêmes ont commencé à rivaliser entre elles ce qui a abouti à une
certaine  paralysie.  Seront-elles  capables  de  sortir  de  leur  inertie  pour  sauver  le  secteur
coopératif qui demeure encore ?
Over  the  last  ten  years  or  so,  the  South  African  wine  industry  has  gone  through  a  ‘triple
transition’  involving  local  industry  deregulation,  internationalisation  and  the  politics  of
democratisation and legal reform.On the surface the industry has responded remarkably well to
these new challenges and opportunities, most notably in the export field where it has won a
significant share in European markets. Sales are also growing in the USA, the Far East and further
afield.However, export success hides a great unevenness in the industry : on the one hand there
are those farmers, cellars and wholesalers who are able to profit from the opportunities offered
by international expansion ;  but on the other hand there are those who can’t. Into the latter
category fall mostly co-operative cellars who even today, ten years later, find it hard to make the
transition.The paper argues that this is mainly due to decades of regulation and international
isolation. Many wine co-operatives lack international competitiveness – not because there is no
wine ‘cluster’ in South Africa, to use Michael Porter’s perspective, but because the wine cluster is
‘low trust’  and has  been inward  looking  for  too  long.  New institutions  have  been set  up  to
support the stragglers and nudge them into the ‘right’ direction. However, as a result of South
Africa’s political past the institutions themselves have become embattled and to some extent
paralysed. Whether they will be able to shake off this inertia and save the co-op sector remains to
be seen.
INDEX
Mots-clés : Afrique du Sud, cave coopérative, cave viticole, démocratisation, dérégulation
indudstrielle, développement international, industrie viticole, Province du Cap, réforme
juridique, vignoble
Keywords : Cape Province, co-operative cellar, international expansion, legal reform, local
industry deregulation, politics of democratization, South Africa, vineyard, wine industry
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